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STATEMENT OF ISSUES 
The State argues that no proof of evidence was made by the 
defendant/appellant to support a finding of standing. Appellant asserts that 
evidence does exists to support the conclusion that the property was the 
appellant's and she does have an expectation of privacy and thereby standing to 
question the legality of the officer's stop and search. Further, appellant argues 
that the State is estopped from asserting such arguments when the trial counsel 
below agreed that the property was the appellant's. 
STATEMENT OF RELEVANT FACTS RE: STANDING 
The State concedes that the Officer had no reasonable cause to search 
neither the car nor its occupants. However, State seeks to deny the effectiveness 
of their previous stipulation entered into the by County Attorney. 
The trial court found that the passenger did not have standing to assert 
the illegality of the search due to her 'passenger' status. The issue was not 
whether the container was her property or not but the trial court denied standing 
due to her 'passenger' status. See Court's ruling. The basis for such reasoning is 
that since she was the passenger (not the driver) she had no standing to question 
the search. The trial court further found that she had abandoned her personal 
property (lip balm) upon exiting the car upon command of the officer. 
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At the motion to suppress hearing, the Court questioned whether the 
container belonged to the defendant. Defendant cited the provisions of the 
preliminary hearing transcript, which the officer acknowledged that the 
container was the defendant/appellant's. It is reported as follows: 
Q. Did you ask Ms Bissegger for permission to search that? 
A, No, I didn't 
Q. Were you aware that that item was Ms. Bissegger's and not Mr. 
Cassin's? 
A. The plastic container. 
Q. Yes. 
A. Yes. (T. 14 L. 10 - L. 17) 
The State of Utah and the defendant through their respective attorneys 
signed a 'Stipulation of Facts'. The State of Utah— via the Utah County 
Attorney's office— agreed to the statement of facts. 
The stipulation provides in relevant parts regarding standing as follows: 
Driver Kassuhn agreed but limited to the search for open containers. 
Kassuhn did not consent to either the search of the defendant passenger 
nor her property. The defendant was not approached for consent to 
search the car, herself nor her property. . . . 
The officer ordered defendant out of the car. Upon being so ordered, 
she (appellant) got out of the car but left some of her personal items in 
the car including a small opaque 'Carmax' container. The container was 
located on the front dash of the car. (T. 6 L. 19. T.6 L. 25.) . . 
As the defendant exited the car (the driver being already out of the 
car), the officer commenced his search. However, the officer looked into 
a small opaque carmax (lip balm) container. The officer knew that the 
container belonged to the defendant passenger. The container is 
approximately Vi inch in diameter and % inch in depth. 
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Further, the Court concluded that the officer acknowledged the container 
to be the defendant's. See Court's ruling. 
The Court then concluded that the defendant did not have standing to 
object to the search of her own property and that she abandoned the property by 
leaving it behind. *This is in contravention to the officer testimony that he commanded 
her to step out of the car. 
The trial court's findings were as follows relating to standing: 
The officer stopped the car for an observed expired registration violation. 
Defendant was a passenger in the car and was asked to get out of the car to allow 
the search for open containers. The officer noted a Carmex container 
approximately V2 inch in diameter and 3A inch in depth. It was left on the 
dashboard. The contents could not be opened without unscrewing the lid and 
looking inside. The officer assumed it belonged to the defendant passenger. 
Based on the above findings, the Court concluded that the defendant, as a 
passenger did not have standing to assert any objections that the driver may 
have had to search of the car. Further, the Court concluded that when the 
defendant left the car she abandoned the container by leaving it behind. She had 
not reasonable expectation of privacy in the container. 
In final analysis, the trial court found that the defendant did not have 
standing due to her passenger status and she abandoned the property. 
The State via the County Attorney agreed that the property was the 
defendant/appellants. The officer conceded that Officer knew the property to be 
the defendant/appellant's. This was not a contested fact at the trial level. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The defendant has standing to assert Fourth Amendment and Article I 
Section 14 rights. She was a passenger in the vehicle that was stopped. She had an 
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expectation of privacy in her property she was forced to leave inside the car per the 
command of the officer. A passenger has an expectation of privacy in stopping a car. 
Further, she has an expectation of privacy in her personal property. 
ARGUMENT 
STANDING TO ASSERT FOURTH AMENDMENT RIGHTS 
Since the decision in Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 88 S.Ct. 507,19 
L.Ed.2d 576 (1967), it has been the law that "capacity to claim the protection of 
the Fourth Amendment depends . . . upon whether the person who claims the 
protection of the Amendment has a legitimate expectation of privacy in the 
invaded place. Guests in a home were found to have standing to object to the 
search of a friend's home. See Minnesota v. Olsen, 495_U.S_91 (1990); State v. 
Rowe, 806 P.12d 730 (Ut. Ct. App. 1991) rev. on other grounds, 850 P.2d 427 (Utah 
1992) 
Passengers in cars have been found to have standing. United States v. 
Sowers, 136 F.3d 24, 27 (1st Cir. 1998). Even passengers in taxicabs have been 
found to have standing. U.S. v. Woodrum, 202 F.3d 1 (1st Cir. 2000); See Rios v. 
United States, 364 U.S. 253, 261 (1960). 
Here, a young female that is forced to get out of the car. Operating 
under this command, she left her personal property inside the car, including thE 
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small Carmax lip balm container. The officer searched her personal property 
including the lip balm container, knowing it to be the passenger's. 
ESTOPPEL 
Yet the State argues that she has no expectation of privacy in her 
recognized personal property. The State is estopped from taking such a 
position. The State, via the Utah County Attorney, agreed at the trial court level 
to the following: 
The defendant passenger was waiting for the officer's investigation to be 
terminated so that she and her boyfriend could be on their way.,.. 
The officer ordered defendant out of the car. Upon being so ordered, she 
got out of the car but left some of her personal items in the car including 
a small opaque 'carmax' container. The container was located on the front 
dash of the car. 
As the defendant exited the car (the driver being already out of the car), 
the officer commenced his search. However, the officer looked into a small opaque 
carmax (lip balm) container. The officer knew that the container 
belonged to the defendant passenger. The container is approximately Vi 
inch in diameter and % inch in depth. 
(Emphasis Added) 
The State of Utah is bound by their agreements. The Attorney General is 
bound by the acts of the trial attorney. The trial attorney had the authority to 
agree to the stipulated facts to forego a full evidentiary hearing. 
Further, the facts set out in the preliminary hearing find that the officer 
knew the property to be that of the defendant/appellant. The trial court agreed 
concluding that the officer assumed that the property was the 
defendant/appellant's. This is bolstered by the fact that the State of Utah 
through their agents agreed that the container was the property of the 
appellant's. But now, the State seeks to escape such agreements made by their 
agent. 
Defendant submits that the State is estopped from making such 
arguments. 
CONCLUSION 
1. Factually, the defendant via proof at the preliminary hearing, the 
stipulation of the State of Utah has provided uncontested facts to support the 
finding that the defendant/appellant had an expectation of privacy in her 
personal property. 
2. The State of Utah is estopped from making an argument contrary to 
their agreements and stipulations entered into at the trial court level. 
Dated this 27th day of March, 2003. 
MAILING CERTIFICATE 
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I hereby certify that I mailed a copy of motion and order to extend time to 
file appellant's brief to: 
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FILED 
Fourth Judicial District Court 
of Utah County, State of Utah 
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
State of Utah, : 
Plaintiff : Ruling on Motion to Suppress 
vs. : Date: March 25,2002 
Lacy Bissegger, : Case Number: 011404652 
Defendant : Division I: Judge James R. Taylor 
This matter came before the Court on March 1, 2002 for hearing on the Defendant's 
Motion to Suppress Evidence. The Court, ruling from the bench, denied the motion. Counsel for 
the Defendant has prepared and submitted a "Ruling on Motion To Suppress & Findings" which 
has been approved as to form by counsel for the State. The Court is, nevertheless, uncomfortable 
with the articulation of the findings and conclusions in the submitted "Ruling " The Court, 
therefore, makes and enters the following findings and ruling. The Court is sensitive to the desire 
of counsel to include facts deemed crucial to any anticipated appeal and, therefore, will entertain 
any reasonable request to supplement this document. 
Facts 
On November 5, 2001 Provo Police Officer Wolken stopped a car westbound on Center 
Street for the observed violation of expired registration. No other criminal violation was noted 
or suspected before the stop. After the stop, at the driver's window, the officer noted an odor of 
alcohol from the driver's breath. The driver was removed from the car and asked to perform field 
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sobriety tests, which he passed. The officer concluded that there was not a DUI violation at that 
point. Because of the odor, the officer did wish to search the car for an open container of alcohol 
and asked for permission to conduct such a search. The driver denied that there were open 
containers in the car. Although there is a dispute as to whether the driver gave permission, gave 
and then revoked permission, or didn't give permission at all this Court specifically declined to 
determine that issue since the Defendant was not the driver and does not have standing to assert 
that issue. 
The Defendant, who was a passenger in the front right seat of the car, was asked to get 
out of the car to allow the search for open containers. As the Defendant got out of the car the 
officer noticed a small, opaque container (a "Carmex" (brand of lip balm) container approximately 
V2 inch in diameter and 3/4 of an inch in depth) on the dashboard which he hadn't seen before 
when looking in the car The content ofhhc container could au be determined MLA,UI 
unscrewing the lid and looking inside. The officer assumed that the container was connected to 
the Defendant because of where it was and when it had become apparent.. The officer opened the 
centainer and discovered methamphetamine which is the basis of the charge in this case. No open 
containers of alcohol or other source for the odor of alcohol were located during the search. 
Both the driver and the Defendant were over age 21 at the time. 
Ruling 
This Court concluded that the Defendant, as a passenger, did not have standing to assert 
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any objections the driver may have had to the fact or the scope of the search of his automobile 
The Court concluded that when the Defendant left the vehicle she abandoned the container, if it 
was hers, by leaving it behind In that posture the Court concluded that she had no reasonable 
expectation of privacy and, therefore, could not object to the search of the container by the 
officer 
The Defendant's motion to suppress is denied 
Dated this 25th day of March, 2002 
A certificate of mailing is on the following page 
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IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, STATE OF UTAH 
UTAH COUNTY, OREM DEPT. 
—ooOoo— 
) AGREED STATEMENT 
STATE OF UTAH, ) OF FACTS RE: SUPPRESSION 
) RULING 
Plaintiff, ) 
vs. ) CASE NO. 011404652 
LACY BISSEGGER ) 
Defendant. ) 
—ooOoo— 
Defendant motioned this Court to suppress evidence herein. Defendant asserted 
that the officers herein conducted an illegal search of the defendant, her property, and the 
automobile of which she was a riding as a passenger. 
The defendant asserts that the arrest/search of the defendant and her property by 
officers herein was in violation of the defendants constitutional rights granted to the 
defendant by the United States Constitution and the Utah State Constitution. 
The Court's ruling is based on the following findings: 
The date of the stop, search and arrest is November 5, 2001 at the hour of 10:39 
p.m. The location of the stop is westbound Center Street, Provo, Utah. 
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As the defendant exited the car (the driver being already out of the car), the officer 
commenced his search. However, the officer looked into a small opaque carmax (lip 
balm) container. The officer knew that the container belonged to the defendant 
passenger. The container is approximately V2 inch in diameter and % inch in depth. 
At hearing, the officer testified that he knew that the container did not contain any 
open containers. The officer could not see inside the small container and could not tell 
what, if anything, was inside until unscrewing the top and looking inside. 
The officer opens the defendant's small carmax container and located 
methamphetamine, which is the basis of this charge. 
The officer(s) found no open containers in the car. No evidence was located to 
substantiate the officer's reported detection of alcohol. 
Dated this day of July, 2002. 
Approved: 
David Clark 
Utah County Attorney Office 
Attorney for Defendant 
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that small object? 
A. No. 
Q. So at that point you decided to expand your search 
into looking inside the container? 
A. Right. Because it looked like it possibly had 
methamphetamine in it, a powdery substance. 
Q. Could it have been any substance other than 
narcotics? 
A. It could have. 
Q. Did you ask Ms. Bissegger for permission to search 
that? 
A. No, I didn't. 
Q. Were you aware that that item was Ms. Bissegger's and 
not Mr. Cassin's? 
A. 
Q. 
A. 
Q. 
A. 
1 the veh: 
Q. 
through 
Ir.e ?las:i: ccn:a:::e-
Yes. 
Yes. 
You thought it was Ms. Bissegger's? 
Yes. Because it wasn't there when I first contacted 
Lcle. 
And when you asked for consent to search the vehicle 
Mr. Cassin, you asked him if you could search for open 
containers? 
A. 
0. 
I just asked if I could search the vehicle. 
Did you ask for any identification from Ms. 
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